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The governmentality and accountability of UK national museums and art galleries 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study furthers our understanding of the role of governmentality mechanisms in relation to 
other-forming and self-forming accounts of art organisations, by using empirical data collected 
from interviews with senior managers of UK national museums and art galleries (MAGs) and 
from secondary published sources. The findings highlight how governmentality mechanisms 
had power-effects through the creation of knowledge about MAGs and the resistance strategies 
of MAGs. Whilst the governmentality mechanisms were expected to ensure the automatic 
functioning of disciplinary power, in some instances the government directly intervened to 
over-ride decisions taken by senior managers when these conflicted with political imperatives.  
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What does it mean to govern a ship? It means clearly to take charge of the sailors, but 
also of the boat and its cargo; to take care of a ship means also to reckon with winds, 
rocks, and storms; and it consists in that activity of establishing a relation between the 
sailors, who are to be taken care of, and the ship, which is to be taken care of, and the 
cargo, which is to be brought safely to port, and all those eventualities like winds, rocks, 
storms, and so on. This is what characterizes the government of a ship (Foucault, 1994, 
p. 209). 
1. Introduction 
Foucault (2007, p. 108) defines the concept of governmentality as “the ensemble formed by 
institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the 
exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power…that we all call “government” and 
which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (appareils) 
on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges (savoirs)”.  
Governmentality not only disciplines and subjugates subjects through procedures, 
calculations, tactics, and strategies (i.e. apparatuses of power) but also treats them as objects 
through the different modes of objectivation (Foucault, 1984). Townley (1993) argues that 
governmentality mechanisms create a body knowledge to objectify those on whom they are 
applied, and turn subjects located in the governmentality discourse into an object of knowledge. 
Understanding the modes of ‘subjectivation’ and ‘objectivation’ of subjects in practice requires 
an analysis of power-relations, and the techniques used in different institutional contexts to act 
upon behaviour  to shape, direct, and modify conduct (Foucault, 1984).  Whilst 
governmentality processes are aimed at forming and reforming subjects into docile bodies, they 
also make subjects observe and analyse their own conduct (ibid.).  
This study attempts to further our understanding of the other-forming and self-forming 
accounts of UK national museums and art galleries (MAGs) by using a governmentality 
theoretical lens. It is based on empirical data collected from interviews with senior officials 
involved in the governance of MAGs and secondary data from the annual reports of MAGs, 
government publications, and press releases.  It makes a theoretical contribution and an 
empirical contribution to the literature as follows. First, prior studies have used a 
governmentality theoretical lens to examine the government of others (Spence & Rinaldi, 2014) 
or government of selves (Manochin, Brignall, Lowe, & Howell, 2011) in specific empirical 
settings. This study makes a theoretical contribution by analysing how governmentality 
processes ‘subjectivates’ and ‘objectivates’ subjects to make them answerable both to others 
and to themselves. It illustrates how governmentality mechanisms created knowledge about 
MAGs, and the power-effects of governmentality mechanisms. Second, whilst prior studies 
have examined issues related to the governance, accountability and financial reporting of art 
organisations in specific countries (Caldwell, 2002; Carnegie & Wolnizer, 1996; Ellwood & 
Greenwood, 2016; Lindqvist, 2007; Oakes & Oakes, 2016), this study makes an empirical 
contribution through its focus on UK national MAGs which are unique in terms of their funding 
structure and political accountability. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section explains the 
governmentality theoretical framework and its key constructs of power, knowledge and 
subjectivation.  Section 3 explains the methods used to collect data for the purpose of this study. 
Section 4 presents the findings by discussing the governmentality of MAGs (i.e. the ensemble 
formed by institutions, processes, analyses, calculations and tactics) and highlighting some of 
the pressures and resistance in governmentality processes. The last section concludes this 
paper. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Governmentality: Power, knowledge and subjectivation 
Power, knowledge and subjectivation of subjects are perhaps three of the most significant 
themes in Foucault’s extensive examination of practices such as psychiatry, clinical medicine, 
penality and sexuality (Foucault, 1965, 1973, 1977, 1978). Power and knowledge are 
coterminous and integral to classifying, categorising and controlling subjects, as stated by 
Foucault (1980, p. 52):  
The exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and 
accumulates new bodies of information…the exercise of power perpetually creates 
knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power.... It is not 
possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not 
to engender power. 
Power is embedded in hegemonic social, economic, and cultural systems. It comes into play in 
social systems comprising of families, companies and institutions and are sustained and 
changed overtime through confrontations (Foucault, 1977, 1980, 1982). According to Foucault 
(1978, p. 94), “power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one 
holds on to or allows to slip away”. Instead power is diffused, relational and it becomes 
apparent when exercised. Power and control encapsulate interests and are directed to shape 
values. Whilst they can be visible and coercive, they are most effective when executed subtly 
in organisational hierarchies through the creation and use of knowledge (Foucault, 1980).  
Institutions, processes, analyses, calculations and tactics give power its effects and 
attempt to render subjects knowable, visible and calculable. As pointed out by Rose (1991) 
governmentality technologies “have an unmistakable power… in the same process in which 
numbers achieve a privileged status in political decisions, they simultaneously promise a “de-
politicization” of politics, redrawing the boundaries between politics and objectivity by 
purporting to act as automatic technical mechanisms for making judgements, prioritizing 
problems and allocating scarce resources” (pp.673-674). However, Rose and Miller (1992) 
argue that the apparatuses of governing, which “include the imposition of law; the activities of 
state functionaries or publicly controlled bureaucracies; surveillance and discipline by an all 
seeing police” may not be very effective at achieving objectives, because governmentality 
technologies are primarily concerned with enabling governments achieve action at a distance 
as opposed to providing freedom to managers to self-govern. 
For governmentality mechanisms to have power-effects, Foucault (1977) asserts that 
subjects must be framed in an enclosure or a space to enable the assignment of responsibilities, 
and ranked or evaluated for performance (Ferlie, Fitzgerald, McGivern, Dopson, & Bennett, 
2013; Townley 1993). Foucault has extensively discussed the governmentality mechanisms 
that enable the government of others and self in his work on prison (1977), psychiatry (1965) 
and medicine (1973). Physical or virtual enclosures define organisational boundaries and 
enable the institutionalisation of governmentality mechanisms (e.g. calculative practices, 
panopticon, and rules and regulations). Within organisational boundaries individuals are 
further partitioned in spaces for the assignment of responsibilities. For example, job 
descriptions often form the basis for performance appraisal and evaluation.  Performance 
measurements,  ranking (such as in league tables), examinations (such as testing and auditing) 
and public judgements not only enable principals evaluate the performance of their subjects, 
but also enable subjects evaluate their own performance.   
Power is purposive. According to Foucault (1978, p. 94-95), “power relations are both 
intentional and nonsubjective…there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and 
objectives”. Governmentality mechanisms are institutionalized, and are a dominant form of 
rationality used to justify the pursuit of policy objectives. Rationalisation have two main 
dimensions: a reasoned justification (or  communicative action) and a strategic instrumental 
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action (Habermas, 1984, 1987). Whilst governmentality mechanisms enable emancipation 
from established ways of doing things and provide managers with the tool to justify a particular 
decision, organisational effectiveness may be undermined by conducting subjects through the 
use of instrumental or purposive means-ends rational governmentality mechanisms (Townley 
2008; Townley, Cooper, & Oakes, 2003; Weber, 1978).  
Inevitably, “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1978, p. 95). Resistance 
is plural and inscribed everywhere in the network of power. For governmentality mechanisms 
to effectively direct subjects towards purposive objectives and avoid resistance, objectives 
should be internalised by subjects. Otherwise, they may result in symbolic violence to subjects 
if the latter are forced to deliver objectives they do not necessarily agree with (Messner, 2009; 
Shearer, 2002). As pointed by   Townley, et al. (2003, p. 1067) resistance arises “when there is 
a growing disarticulation between a discourse operating as communicative rationalisation, but 
being operationalised through mechanisms that predominantly reflect dimensions of an 
instrumental rationalization”. Whilst resistance may be mitigated through communication with 
subjects to gain their approval and support, the instrumental implementation of 
governmentality technologies to direct behaviour towards purposeful objectives may 
destabilise relationships.   
The generation of knowledge about a subject to judge and evaluate not only creates 
discipline, but also has normalising consequences. According to Foucault (1991, p. 181), 
“distribution according to ranks or grades has a double role; it marks the gaps, hierarchizes 
qualities, skills and aptitudes; but it also punishes and rewards”. Behaviour are internalised and 
norms of acceptable performance are reinforced through education, training and/or coercion 
mechanisms. The effect of the knowledge and power structures is that the subject (e.g. worker, 
madman and prisoner) becomes an object of knowledge. Disciplinary power creates norm, as 
stated by Foucault (1991, p.223): “disciplines characterize, classify, specialize; they distribute 
along a scale, around a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one another and, if 
necessary, disqualify and invalidate”.  
The concept of governmentality has been widely used in the social sciences, to study 
governance and accountability issues in both private sector (Miller & O'Leary, 1987; Spence 
& Rinaldi, 2014) and public sector institutions (Ferlie, et al., 2013; Manochin, et al., 2011). 
For example, Manochin, et al (2011) examined how the use of a traffic lights system by a 
housing association provided a visual representation of performance in various areas and 
enabled the housing association improve accountability not only to government departments 
but also to themselves. Bigoni & Funnell (2015, p. 161) examined the “genealogical core of 
governmentality in the context of the Church at a time of great crisis in the 15th century when 
the Roman Catholic Church was undergoing reform instituted by Pope Eugenius IV(1431–
1447)”. Their study suggests that “accounting was one of the technologies that allowed the 
bishops to control both the diocese as a whole and each priest, to subjugate the priests to the 
bishops’ authority and, thereby, to govern the diocese through a never-ending extraction of 
truth” (Bigoni and Funnell, 2015, p. 160). 
 
2.2 Governance and accountability issues in MAGs 
Prior studies focussing on the empirical context of MAGs have examined issues such as: how 
“a variety of practices, techniques, measures and reports” such as accruals accounting, 
budgetary control processes, performance measures, and cash flows and financial reports 
“enhance the accountability of museum managers”? (Carnegie & Wolnizer, 1996, pp. 84-90; 
Christiansen & Skærbæk, 1997); the effects of public sector reforms on public governance and 
management of art organisations (Lindqvist, 2007, 2012); ‘the role of calculative practices’ in 
reconciling conflicting cultural and managerial values and guiding parties towards census and 
productive actions (Mikes & Morhart, 2016; Tlili, 2014); the importance and usefulness of 
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technological “knowledge of how to do things, how to accomplish goals…in such areas as 
administration and communication, marketing and product” (Rentschler & Potter, 1996, p. 
101); and, the pedagogical “role of language and power” in business plans as a mechanism to 
direct and control art organisations (Oakes , Townley, & Cooper, 1998, p. 257). 
 Oakes , et al. (1998) use a Bourdieusian theoretical lens to examine the role of language 
and power in controlling museums and cultural heritage sites in Alberta, Canada. They found 
that central government demonstrated their power over museums and heritage sites “directly, 
by requiring business plans, and indirectly, by rejecting plans that did not fit an unspecified 
version of the correct, implicit template” (p. 284). This resulted in symbolic violence as the 
dominant control discourses of the government displaced other forms of expression by the 
managers of museums and heritage sites (Bourdieu, 1990; Bourdieu, Darbel, & Schnapper, 
1991).  
Prior studies have suggested that to survive in the increasingly complex and changing 
environment, MAGs have to embrace governance reforms, such the adoption of new 
management techniques, and using technology (Lindqvist, 2007, 2012; Rentschler & Potter, 
1996). Similarly, Carnegie and Wolnizer (1996, p.85) state that, as a centre for “preservation, 
conservation, presentation, investigation and public enjoyment of the world’s collections and 
cultural values”, MAGs should be innovative, utilise digital technologies and information, and 
compete at the international level to ensure their long-term survival. In the context of the USA, 
Christensen & Mohr (2003, p. 155) argue that MAGs are primarily accountable to their funders 
who need accountability information “ to make resource allocation decisions and assess how 
well managers are utilising their contributions”. In the context of Italy, Ferri & Zan (2014)  
found that MAGs have adopted new management accounting techniques to meet the 
accountability demands from government, non-government sponsors and private/individual 
donors (Zan, 2002). 
Whilst governance reforms are aimed at improving the accountabilities of MAGs, they 
may have unintended consequences and result in resistance. For example, Oakes and Oakes 
(2016) found that regional art organisations in the UK strategically mitigated the impact of 
accounting colonisation by transforming accounting through a range of narratives and visual 
reporting methods. Ellwood and Greenwood (2016) argue that measuring value of heritage 
assets, though not killing the cat, can lead to a change in the perceived cultural value of the 
assets. Lindqvist (2007) found that the fragmentation of responsibility among managers due to 
increasing accountability demand by various stakeholder has led to an increase in costs and 
placed additional pressures on MAGs, especially when “financial pressure is combined with 
increasing demand for visible performance and compliance with political priorities” 
(Lindqvist, 2012, p. 23). Tlili (2014) argues that funders’ objectives can overload MAGs by  
pulling them in different directions, and objectives and targets can be (mis)interpreted in 
multiple ways. Moreover, the author questions the value of the costly accounting information 
that are routinely gathered by arguing that accounting information are unable to  usefully and 
fully capture the complex activities of MAGs and may become an end in itself  (Tlili, 2014).  
In contrast, Mikes and Morhart (2016) illustrated how calculative practices played a 
catalysing role in the creation of cultural goods. They demonstrated the transformative power 
of calculative practices in the creation of the Charlie Chaplin museum. Accounting practices 
were used to reconcile the competing and conflicting objectives of multiple parties and guide 
them towards the development of evaluative principles to reach consensus and enable 
productive action. 
This study contributes to the literature examining the governance and accountability of 
MAGs, by adopting a governmentality theoretical lens to provide insightful understanding of 
what is involved in rendering subjects (i.e. UK national MAGs) knowable. More specifically, 
through what techniques, procedures and processes a subject becomes known? How the 
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techniques, procedures and processes are established and operate? What effects do they have 
on the subject? How the subjects are rendered visible to others and themselves? A 
governmentality framework emphasizes the importance of understanding: the governmentality 
mechanisms that make knowledge of the subject possible, and the power-effects of 
governmentality mechanisms in a network of relationships. As pointed by Townley (1993, 
pp.537-538), investigating these types of questions which relate to the production of knowledge 
and its power-effects requires researchers attempting such an endeavour to distance themselves 
from a research paradigm that conceives “practices as a technicist construct”. The next section 
explains the research methods used to understand how governmentality mechanisms operate to 
render the conduct of UK national MAGs visible. 
 
3. Research methods 
This study focusses on understanding techniques, procedures, processes used to govern UK 
national MAGs and their power-effects. To achieve its objective, twenty semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with senior officers from: the Department for Culture, Media & 
Sport (DCMS), non-government sponsors and donors, and the boards of trustees and senior 
management teams of two national museums and two art galleries located in London. National 
MAGs located in London were selected primarily because of the important role these 
organisations play in the implementation of public policies. Secondary data were obtained from 
Acts of Parliament, the accounting reports of MAGs, government publications, and press 
releases. As critical researchers, we examined the methods of control and rendering visibility 
in governmentality processes, whilst recognising that governmentality processes are 
intertwined with ideologies and interests.  Table 1 provides a summary of the data collection 
methods.  
 
Table 1: Data collection methods 
 Methods Position of interviewees & documents analysed 
1. Semi-
structured 
interviews.  
 
Trustees of MAGs, Chief executive officers; Finance directors; 
Directors of governance; Curators, Directors of public engagement; 
Directors of development (sixteen interviewees in total from MAGs). 
Private donor/sponsors (two interviewees). 
Senior officers from DCMS (two interviewees). 
 
2.  Secondary data 
from published 
sources. 
 
Acts of Parliament, accounting reports, funding agreements, key 
performance indicators, MAGs’ webpages, and press releases.  
 
 
Each interview lasted between one hour and one and a half hour. The interviews were tape-
recorded with the permission of the interviewees and were transcribed immediately after the 
interview to enable accurate recall and transcription. The interviewees were informed that their 
names would not be revealed when writing up the findings, although their organisations may 
be identified from quotations and references to data from published sources. 
The interviewees provided insights into the institutions, procedures, processes and tactics 
used to direct and control MAGs. Senior managers explained the role of the MAGs, the 
expectations of their stakeholders, power-relationships and resistance. More specifically, they 
clarified the activities of the MAGs, how MAGs are regulated, how MAGs are financed, and 
the (dis)agreements the MAGs have with the government and non-government funders. 
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Information from public sources contained different types of discourses of MAGs. 
According to Foucault (1972, p. 27), a discourse refers to “the totality of all effective statements 
(whether spoken or written)” and includes things that are thought, said (e.g. interviews) or 
written (e.g. texts) about a subject and the practices, structures, rules and norms operating in a 
social context. Foucault (1972) suggests that there are many ways of seeing and talking about 
the world and acknowledges that many discourses from various sources operate 
simultaneously. Acts of Parliament and funding agreements contained discourses regarding the 
statutory duties of trustees and their contractual agreement with the government.   
Information contained in the annual reports of MAGs, press releases and webpages 
contained discourses regarding: their objectives and governance; their funding structure; their 
activities; the stakeholders to whom they are answerable to including the nature of their duties 
and relationships; and how they contributed towards achieving socio-economic, community 
and other objectives (Carnegie & West, 2005; Davison, 2007).  
 
4. Findings: The governmentality of UK museums and art galleries 
This section presents the findings by discussing the governmentality of UK national MAGs, 
and highlighting some of the pressures and resistance in governmentality processes. 
 
4.1 Governmentality: institutions, processes, analyses, calculations and tactics 
Governmentality mechanisms, comprising of government and regulatory institutions, rules and 
regulations, performance measures, and accounting reports, were used to steer MAGs towards 
the achievement of objectives and to make their conduct visible. These mechanisms not only 
enabled MAGs to discharge accountability to others, but to themselves as well. 
In the UK, specific Acts of Parliament govern the cultural, charitable and trading 
activities conducted by MAGs (refer to table 2). One of the interviewees pointed out that these 
regulatory mechanisms governing the activities of MAGs are complicated and do not intersect 
in a helpful way: 
Perhaps what is even more complicated is the regulatory environment. The public 
sector isn’t the only one environment we operate in. We also operate in the charitable 
sector, because we are a registered charity, and therefore have a relationship with the 
Charity Commission. And, we also operate in the private sector, because we are also a 
commercial business. Those three regulatory environments intersect, and often not in 
a very helpful way (Director of public engagement, M1). 
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Table 2: Regulatory framework governing the activities of UK MAGs 
Nature of activities Governance of activities
 
Cultural  
Museums and Galleries Act 1992  
British Museum Act 1963 
National Heritage Act 1983 
Charitable  Charities Act 2011  
Trading  Companies Act 2006 
 
Trustees of MAGs are appointed by the government to implement public policy objectives. 
The statutory duties of the Board of Trustees of museums and art galleries are enshrined in 
Section 2(1) of  the Museums and Galleries Act of 1992 which states that MAGs have to: (a) 
“care for, preserve and add to the works of art”, (b) “secure that the works of art are exhibited 
to the public”, (c)“ secure that the works of art and the documents are available to persons 
seeking to inspect them in connection with study or research”, and (d) “generally promote the 
public’s enjoyment and understanding of painting and other fine art both by means of the 
Board’s collection and by such other means as they consider appropriate”. The annual report 
of the National History Museum explained how the trustees are appointed as follows: 
The Museum is governed by a Board of 12 Trustees who are appointed by the Prime 
Minister (8), the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport on recommendation by 
the Royal Society (1) or co-opted by the Board of Trustees themselves (3). Those 
appointed by the Prime Minister are appointed by open competition. 
(National History Museum Annual Report, 2014-15, p. 3). 
 
Whilst MAGs have to provide visibility to the government and Parliament, they are also 
answerable to non-government sponsors and donors, the community and employees. Figure 1 
provides an overview of the expectations of these stakeholders and how MAGs discharge their 
accountabilities. 
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Figure 1: Governmentality of UK national MAGs: Meeting accountability expectations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Expectations  
  Discharge of accountability by MAGs 
 
 
 
DCMS, HM Treasury, National 
Audit Office and Parliament. 
The community, schools 
and universities. 
Museums and 
art galleries. 
Trustees, 
management,  
and employees. 
Non-government 
sponsors, and 
donors. 
Political and managerial 
accountability: Demonstrate 
compliance with rules and 
regulations, and implement 
government policy objectives. 
Expectation: Achieve policy 
objectives; staff welfare and 
professionalism. 
Activities: Delivery of duties, 
adhere to rules and regulations, 
and demonstrate professionalism. 
Expectation: Compliance with rules and 
regulations, value for money, meet 
performance targets and policy objectives. 
Activities: Enact Acts and accounting 
rules, check compliance, and provide 
funding and key performance targets. 
Expectation: Value for money, 
philanthropy, collaboration. 
Activities: Financial and non-financial 
donations, partnership, and research. 
Expectation: High quality services, 
economic regeneration. 
Activities: Attend exhibitions and engage 
in leisure and research activities. 
Managerial accountability to 3rd party 
funders: Explain how donations have 
been used; acknowledgement; and fund 
specific initiatives (e.g. research 
opportunities, and school visits). 
Internal accountability: 
Fulfilment of mission and 
objectives; Staff welfare, 
training and personal 
development. 
Social accountability: Display 
work of art; engage with 
community; provide access to 
collections 
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MAGs are primarily funded by taxpayers’ money, and in return the government requires them 
to provide free entry to enable the general public enjoy their collections. For example, the 
funding agreement between the DCMS and the Tate Gallery laid out the expectations of the 
government as follows: 
 The grant aid allocation is dependent on Tate maintaining free admission to the 
permanent collections...The Secretary of State’s letter expects… the world-class 
collections and front-line services of Tate to be protected...  that free entry to the 
permanent collections of the national museums will continue to be available… that Tate 
will pursue ways to increase its self-generated income, including through private 
giving...Tate will undertake to comply with all relevant legislation...will supply DCMS 
each year with the regular financial information set out in the data collection schedule, 
as well as returns against 12 performance indicators supplied by DCMS (annexed)… 
This information, together with Annual Reports and any further reports Tate prepares in 
relation to progress against its own corporate priorities, will be used to monitor annual 
performance. 
(DCMS, Funding agreement, 2011, pp. 1-2). 
 
Performance measures and accounting reports make the activities of MAGs visible to their 
stakeholders. For example, the DCMS obtains action at a distance by requiring MAGs to report 
on key performance indicators specified in a funding agreement, and to comply with rules and 
regulations. The funding and regulatory mechanisms have normalisation consequences in the 
form of reward or punishment (Foucault, 1991). Accountability is predominantly political and 
managerial, and flows upward from the MAGs to DCMS, HM Treasury, National Audit Office 
and Parliament (Hodges, 2012).  
MAGs are answerable to their non-government donors and sponsors who fund specific 
initiatives (e.g. social inclusion, engagement with minorities, education of children, and 
funding of research). A director from a museum distinguished the difference between 
sponsorship from corporations, and trusts and foundations by stating that the relationship with 
corporations is governed through a strict legal contract whilst the relationship with trusts and 
foundations is less formal:  
With major corporate donors, there is a contract attached to it… So there are structured 
legal agreements. For example, we have an agreement with BP which lays out the nature 
of partnership with them…With trusts and foundations, sometimes there is a 
memorandum of agreement, containing details of the reason for the money being given. 
The gallery says it will direct the activity and funds towards activities the funding have 
been provided for. So we have different levels of agreement ranging from a strong legal 
contract to a purely verbal philanthropic agreement (Director of Development, AG1). 
 
MAGs make their conduct visible by reporting on the progress of projects and achievement of 
explicit or implied objectives. As stated by a director from one museum: 
You have to set up project objectives for the project and meet sponsors’ priorities. They 
may ask for other things to be included. They monitor the project quite closely; you will 
need to meet them very regularly. You would have to demonstrate that you have used the 
fund to meet objectives, and to evaluate achievement of objectives afterwards (Director 
of Governance, M2). 
 
To obtain the agreement and support of their sponsors, help stabilise relationships, and provide 
greater visibility on how funds have been expended, they often invite their sponsors to work 
together on specific projects. As explained by the curator of one museum: 
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If we are working with academics on developing an exhibition, they are brought together 
to work on something. Whilst with external funders, it is a continued period of keeping 
them informed, making them know what the money is paying for…. Quite a lot of controls 
are in place (Curator, M2). 
 
Whilst reporting mechanisms are used to justify how funds have been used, MAGs have some 
autonomy over decisions and courses of actions to achieve objectives. The intensity of 
reporting to funders depends on the nature of the project and the materiality of the funding. As 
stated by a director of sponsor: 
Usually we ask for an end of grant report. So the MAGs basically tell what they have 
done with the money. For major funding a full report is required, and for minor funding 
the MAGs just have to only say what the outcome of the project was. If the money is for 
a big building then, we would require a full report which would include a survey and 
compliance with building regulations, etc. We are fairly hands-off in terms of how they 
handle the project, but we just want to make sure they use the money appropriately. So 
basically they have to tell us what they spend the money on and what the outcomes were 
(Sponsor 1). 
 
However, a different sponsor (Sponsor 2) explained that it uses contractual agreement and 
performance based payment mechanism to normalise the behaviour of MAGs and motivate 
them to delivery on their promises: 
There is a contract between the museums and ourselves which have to be signed by 
somebody senior, usually the director or the chair. Then we have a monitoring regime 
beyond that. So for fairly low grant the standard monitoring regime is three reports. Not 
long after they start, midway and then at the end. We hold 10% back of the grant until 
they provide us an evaluation, so we have an evaluation report at the end. Depending on 
the project, we might put someone to monitor as well to report to us and to flag any 
problems identified. And then for a bigger project, those reports are expected every six 
months. So there is a process all the way through so that we can see they deliver what 
they promise to do (Sponsor 2). 
 
MAGs establish norms of acceptable behaviour and internalise them through the provision of 
training and development and employment contracts with their employees. For example, 
MAGs are required to adhere to a Code of Ethics which they incorporate in their employees’ 
employment contract and sponsors’ standard contract: 
We encourages employees to adhere to the Code of Ethics for Museums as a contractual 
requirement. We achieve this by including reference to upholding and promoting the 
Code of Ethics for Museums in job descriptions that form part of our employees’ contract 
of employment and contract with sponsors (Trustee, AG2). 
 
In summary, the ensemble formed by government and regulatory institutions, procedures and 
processes, and calculations are used to make the conduct of MAGs visible to their stakeholders. 
They have the normalising effects of making MAGs deliver on their promises. However, 
governmentality mechanisms are universal and assume that subjects are homogenous. Partly 
as a result of this, there have been pressures and resistance in governmentality processes. These 
are discussed next. 
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4.2 Pressures and resistance in governmentality processes 
As mentioned by Foucault (1978), where there is power, there is resistance. Governmentality 
technologies created discipline by steering MAGs towards achieving the objectives of their 
government and non-government funders. However, senior managers argued that the 
objectives of MAGs should be determined by senior management, and because MAGs are 
heterogeneous entities they should not be governed by generic key performance indicators.  
MAGs silently resisted government’s control by providing selective visibility on their 
activities. For example, they prepared comprehensive reports for the board of trustees which 
they did not provide to DCMS. As strongly argued by a director of public engagement: 
I would argue very strongly that it is more important for us, as an institution, to decide 
what our strategic objectives should be based on our history, what we are trying to 
achieve, and what the operating environment looks like. We report to our governing body 
or the trustees on certain strategic objectives which we don’t report to DCMS, because 
the DCMS’s key performance indicators may or may not be relevant to what we are 
trying to achieve (Director of Public Engagement, M1). 
 
Moreover, the MAGs adapted the government’s performance management system in the form 
of a traffic light system to monitor their own performance. A finance director explained that 
they use a simple traffic light system, comprising of red, orange and green colours to provide 
them with a visual representation of their performance in areas of importance to them: 
We have performance matrix for key objectives, which may be a cost target, or a deadline 
for us to meet, or to increase funds from certain sources by certain amount. We use a 
simple traffic light system to measure our performance. For example, if something is red, 
the trustees would want us to provide an explanation and what we are doing to remedy 
it (Finance Director, M2). 
 
However, the MAGs strategically resisted governmentality mechanisms by adopting a 
persuasive approach, as opposed to a confrontational one, because they did not want to upset 
their principal funder. They acknowledge that, ultimately, it is the government that has power 
over their decisions. For example, a director of development from a museum explained that: 
What we can do is demonstrate what will work and what won’t work. If we don’t agree, 
we just say no we don’t want to get involved in that. But we have to be very careful 
because we are conscious that they are our funders, particularly DCMS. So it is a 
political battle with words about which initiative we would choose to be involved in, and 
which one we won’t be involved in. Ultimately it is the government’s decision that often 
prevails (Director of Development, M2). 
 
Whilst resistance was generally covert and subtle, there were instances when it was overt. For 
example, the trustees and senior managers of a MAG made the strategic decision to close one 
of its branches. However, this decision was over-ruled by the government (i.e. DCMS) who 
argued that the closure would have negative social and economic impact on the community.  A 
trustee explained that: 
In theory we can close one of our museums, but in practice we can’t because of their 
social and economic impact…Last year, we decided to close one of our museums in 
Bradford because it was not financially viable. But DCMS said no we cannot close the 
museum. The government imposed conditions as part of the grant-in-aid funding for us 
to keep the museum open (Trustee 1, M2). 
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Although the government overtly demonstrated their power by over-riding senior 
management’s decision, the latter strategically reduced their activities, downsized, and 
required visitors to pay for special exhibits. As stated by the trustee:  
You know when the government said we were not allowed to close our museum, we 
revised our plans. And we are cutting a lot of activities of the museum, we are cutting 
staff, we have already moved out one of our buildings and we have already outsourced 
some of the offerings to cut cost. So we created the plan that was much more manageable. 
(T2, M2). 
 
Senior managers from MAGs argued that they sometimes voiced their resistance when coerced 
into implementing the government’s initiatives, such as STEM (science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics) projects. A director from a museum explained that they were 
not consulted and did not necessarily agree with this initiative:   
There was an initiative that came out of government about how to get new people to study 
STEM. I think you often wonder why the next initiative is not informed by the previous 
initiative. Where does the new one come from? We are used as a platform very often, 
either to promote that initiative or inform that initiative. It can be quite difficult because 
some of those initiatives we don’t agree with. We know that it won’t work (Director of 
Development, M1).  
 
The government’s prerogative to reduce the funding of MAGs under the guise of austerity and 
to raise funding from non-government sources have created pressures to cut costs and obtain 
funding from other sources. A CEO of one museum explained that MAGs face high fixed costs 
which place pressure on their budget:  
Our biggest challenge is financial. Government funding has fallen by more than 25% in 
real terms between 2010 and now, and next year it will fall. Well, we know our funding 
was cut for 2015-16. So we would have to find additional funding to make up the 
difference or cut expenditure to reflect that. We are an organisation that has very high 
fixed costs. These buildings need to be maintained and the collections need to be looked 
after. Lots of our costs are unavoidable. Costs have gone up far faster than the rate of 
inflation, and yet our funding is falling (CEO, M1). 
 
To reduce financial dependence on the government and gain greater autonomy, MAGs are 
finding ways to increase funding from charitable and trading activities.  As explained by a 
director of development: 
We want our income from non-government sources to reach 60% of total income, and to 
have 40% income from government. However, we don’t want government grant to 
reduce. We just want our overall income to increase. That is, we want a growth in the 
proportion of our philanthropic and commercial income (Director of Development, M2). 
 
However, increasing the proportion of funding MAGs from non-government sources may lead 
to a change in power-relationships and further pressures, as non-government funders may steer 
MAGs in different directions. A principal curator from a museum highlighted that placing 
greater reliance on corporate and private sponsors may influence the culture of MAGs: 
Donors have too much restrictions; we won’t really want to touch them so much. If they 
want to get their names on the main hall, that is fine. So we won’t be driven by donors. 
That is why I am very concerned if the government funding goes down. We might be 
heavily relying on the donors, because it then affects the political drivers and culture of 
the museum (Curator, M1). 
 
15 
 
MAGs were required to report on their activities and justify how they have used their funding 
from government and non-government sources. However, they silently resisted to the 
requirement to treat money they have raised from charitable and commercial sources as 
taxpayers’ money. As argued by a CEO: 
Our trustees and I personally, are accountable for public funds, but any money that 
passes through the organisation has to be treated as public money. So any charitable 
money or any commercial income that comes to the museum, arguably isn’t taxpayers’ 
money but has to be treated as if it is (CEO, M2).  
 
However, in recent years MAGs successfully negotiated for financial freedom with the 
government. As explained by a director of finance:  
Increasingly there is some flexibility and recognition within the government that 
museums need to be given a certain amount of freedom. This just started in recent years. 
Obviously different governments have different approaches. During the last spending 
review, a certain number of operational freedom for museums was negotiated and 
secured. They are very specific but they help us have much more control now than before 
(DOF2, M2). 
 
Resistance was also apparent in the process of appointing trustees. Senior managers pointed 
out that MAGs should have greater control over the appointment of trustees, rather than the 
government.  However, the Public Appointment Advisor from DCMS argued that because 
MAGs are mainly funded by public money, the government should appoint trustees: 
Because MAGs are funded by public money, it is right that ministers have some degree 
of influence on the decision-making machinery of the museum and gallery… The trustees 
are there on the board to ensure the director does what is necessary and are accountable 
to the ministers and government for their performance of that responsibility (Public 
Appointment Advisor, DCMS). 
 
In summary, MAGs operate in the space of culture and are responsible for achieving pre-
defined policy objectives. In this enclosure, MAGs are further partitioned in terms of their 
organisational boundaries, specific location and nature of their activities (e.g. science, history 
and art). They are directed, appraised and ranked through various governmentality 
mechanisms. The governmentality mechanisms used to govern MAGs at a distance are 
primarily aimed at making their conduct visible to the government which provided the bulk of 
their funding. This study has highlighted how subjects resisted to governmentality 
mechanisms. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study has adopted a governmentality theoretical lens to examine the institutions, 
processes, analyses, calculations and tactics through which MAGs are rendered visible. It has 
illustrated how a body of knowledge exerts disciplinary power in practice to subjectify and 
objectify MAGs. Governmentality mechanisms involved the deployment of multiple methods 
(e.g. management agreements, contracts, key performance indicators, accounting reports and 
appointment of trustees) to create knowledge, provide visibility and render subjects into 
calculable objects.  
Governmentality mechanisms placed subjects in a space, partitioned them, defined 
responsibilities, and provided visibility to create discipline. Whilst MAGs operate in the 
cultural space, their roles are wide-ranging. In contemporary society, MAGs serve cultural, 
social and economic objectives. For example, they serve the purpose of preserving a 
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community’s cultural memory in trust for future generations; bonding the various segments of 
the population together to create peace in the community;  acting as agents of change by 
educating the population and providing citizens with an avenue for discussion and dialogue 
over significant matters; reaching target groups like youth, women and minority through 
programmes and activities;  and promoting better understanding of cultural heritage and 
creating agenda for growth and development. In the light of their importance, the UK 
government funds national MAGs and use them to implement public policy objectives.  The 
UK government has attempted to remove barriers to entry in the market for cultural capital by 
providing free entry to enable the wider public enjoy the exhibits of MAGs. In addition to 
serving the traditional role of collecting, preserving, and displaying objects and work of art, 
the UK government requires MAGs to work with universities, schools and the local community 
to foster interest in science, technology engineering and mathematics (STEM), create cohesion 
among the population, and reach specific groups. 
In the pursuit of objective ranking and rationality, MAGs were required to quantify their 
performance in contracts and reports. However, although MAGs were rendered visible and 
calculable through governmentality mechanisms, the relationship between MAGs and their 
stakeholders was to some extent indeterminate. Whilst the provision of knowledge is central to 
controlling subjects, the indeterminate relationship provided MAGs with some discretion to 
execute strategies to achieve objectives. However, the government showed their power by 
directly intervening to over-ride the rational economic decisions taken by senior managers, 
when these conflicted with political objectives. The dominant discourses of the government 
displaced the expression and decision of MAGs, resulting in resistance. Moreover, whilst 
governmentality mechanisms attempted to render MAGs docile, MAGs were complicit in the 
process of their own domination. Where they could not overtly resist governmentality 
mechanisms, they silently resisted.   
Governmentality provides MAGs with the tools to rationalise/justify their conduct to 
others and themselves. Because of their focus at making MAGs answerable to the government, 
the governmentality technologies do not effectively enable MAGs answer to themselves and 
to other non-government funders. Financial independence from the government and the 
inability of governmentality technologies to govern the heterogeneous activities of MAGs have 
created tensions in the governance process. To the extent that governmentality technologies 
had a purposive end which were incompatible with the objectives of MAGs, they had 
dysfunctional consequences. Governmentality is intrinsic to governing MAGs and the power 
of justification give legitimacy to political objectives.  Performance measures were used to 
provide transparency and make the conduct of MAGs visible to others. They helped justify the 
implementation of policies and programmes, and in the process provided legitimacy to the 
existence of MAGs themselves. Performance measures were deployed to make MAGs 
accountable for their activities and use of public money. However, there was resistance to the 
purposive actions of government because: the KPIs were generic and not discursively agreed 
with the MAGs; the MAGs were also funded from other source; and in some instances the KPIs 
hindered the MAGs to pursue their heterogeneous objectives.   
It is argued that governmentality technologies should enable MAGs cope with the 
challenge of: simultaneously meeting multiple accountability objectives, shifting the focus 
from accounting to specific stakeholder group to accounting to multiple stakeholders, 
providing autonomy to MAGs, and enabling MAGs better manage conflicting accountability 
expectations. However, meeting these challenges has the potential to create new problems. For 
example, whilst MAGs may raise funding from non-government sources to enable them meet 
financial challenges and maintaining a satisfactorily level of service, reliance on income from 
non-government sources is highly risky because it is unstable and a substantial portion of the 
costs of MAGs are fixed. Moreover, initiatives to raise fund from non-government sources may 
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result in a clash between commercial ethos and cultural ethos. Profit making activities, such as 
increasing the number of paid exhibitions (whilst continuing to provide free general 
admission), and partnerships with corporate donors, may change the strategic directions of 
MAGs. For example, increasing the number of paid exhibits and commercial activities may 
attract more visitors from the elite class, which may defeat the government’s policy objective 
of promoting social inclusion.   
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